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`Funding the Millennium Development 
Goals1
 
A. B. Atkinson 
 
1. Introduction 
 At the Millennium Summit in September 2000, the states of the United 
Nations set out a vision of a global partnership for development, directed 
at the achievement of specific targets. Specifically, 189 countries signed up 
to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) summarised in Box 1. The 
concrete goals include the halving by 2015 of the proportion of people 
living in extreme poverty, halving the proportion hungry, and halving the 
proportion lacking access to safe drinking water. The objectives include the 
achievement of universal primary education and gender equality in 
education, the achievement by 2015 of a three-fourths decline in maternal 
mortality and a two-thirds decline in mortality among children under 5 
years. They include halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS and 
providing special assistance to AIDS orphans. 
Since the declaration of the MDGs, a number of attempts have been 
made to estimate the financing requirements. At a global level, the Report 
of the Panel chaired by President Zedillo (United Nations, 2001) estimated 
conservatively that an additional US$50 billion would be required annually 
to achieve the international development goals. The World Bank study by 
Devarajan, Miller and Swanson (2002) estimated that the cost of the 
MDGs would involve additional sums of between $40 and $60 billion. All 
such figures are estimates, and involve matters of judgement, but it seems 
reasonable for present purposes to take a figure of an additional US$50 
billion as being required annually to achieve the development goals. This is 
 
1 This lecture draws on Atkinson (2004), a report prepared at the request of the United 
Nations, under the auspices of WIDER, Helsinki, by a team of authors: Tony Addison, 
Ernest Aryeetey, Robin Boadway, Abdur Chowdhury, George Mavrotas, John Micklewright, 
James Mirrlees, Machiko Nissanke, Agnar Sandmo, Andrés Solimano, and Anna Wright. 
The project benefited a great deal from the comments of Anthony Clunies-Ross, Inge Kaul 
and Adrian Wood. I would like to thank them all warmly for their contributions, without 
implicating them in the views expressed here.  
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the figure cited in the Global Monitoring Report 2004 (World Bank, 2004, 
p. 166), and it is the ‘ballpark’ figure that I use here.  
Box 1: Summary of Millennium Development Goals 
Goal 1 
Eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger 
• Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people whose income is less than US$1 a day. 
• Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people who suffer from hunger. 
  
Goal 2 
Achieve universal primary 
education 
• Ensure that by 2015 all children will be able to 
complete a full course of primary schooling. 
  
Goal 3 
Promote gender equality 
and empower women 
• Eliminate gender disparity in all levels of 
education by 2015. 
  
Goal 4 
Reduce child mortality 
• Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, 
the under-5 mortality rate. 
  
Goal 5 
Improve maternal health 
• Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 
2015, the maternal mortality ratio. 
  
Goal 6 
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria 
and other diseases 
• Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the 
spread of HIV/AIDS. 
• Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the 
spread of malaria and other major diseases. 
  
Goal 7 
Ensure environmental  
sustainability 
• Integrate principles of sustainable development 
into country policies and reverse the loss of 
environmental resources. 
• Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without 
sustainable access to safe drinking water. 
• Have achieved, by 2020, a significant 
improvement in the lives of at least 100 million 
slum dwellers. 
  
Goal 8 
Develop a global partnership 
for development 
• Develop the world trading and financial system. 
• loped Address the special needs of the least deve
and landlocked and small island countries. 
•  with the debt problems of Deal comprehensively
developing countries. 
 
This sum is broadly equivalent to doubling Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), which in 2002 was $58 billion. Indeed at the Monterrey 
conference in that year, it was agreed by donor countries to increase ODA 
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by about  $18.5  billion in real terms – see Figure 1, taken from  the Global 
Monitoring Report (World Bank, 2004, Figure 11.1). This would still leave 
a sizeable shortfall, as indicated by the heavy dashed line. But the amount 
required is still modest as a percentage of the donors’ Gross National 
Income. With the additional $50 billion, the target is some 0.4 per cent of 
GNI, or well short of the frequently discussed target of 0.7 per cent GNI. 
Indeed as a percentage, it would not be very different from that achieved in 
the early 1990s. I stress this point, because, although I shall come back to 
increasing ODA at the end, I primarily consider alternatives to raising 
ODA. These are all more complex and each involves its own problems. If 
unconditional ODA were to be sufficiently increased, then this would 
undoubtedly be more direct. As is argued by Reisen, “… the most 
straightforward way to avoid underfunding of the Goals is to raise ODA 
further” (2004, p. 1). However, I believe that we need to pursue both 
routes, not least because time is of the essence. 
Figure 1: Aid in Real Terms 
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2. New Sources of Development Finance 
 The UN General Assembly asked for an investigation of alternative 
sources, adopting a resolution calling for “… a rigorous analysis of the 
advantages, disadvantages and other implications of proposals for 
developing new and innovative sources of funding, both public and private, 
for dedication to social development and poverty eradication 
programmes”. The remit was clearly wide, and in our report for WIDER 
we concentrated on only seven of the many possibilities, as summarised in 
Box 2: (1) a global environmental tax; (2) a tax on currency flows (the 
‘Tobin tax’); (3) creation by the IMF of new Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs); (4) the International Finance Facility, proposed by the UK 
Government; (5) increased private donations for development; (6) a global 
lottery or a global prize bond; and (7) increased remittances from 
emigrants.  
It will be evident that our coverage is far from exhaustive. In the case of 
global taxes, there are a number of other candidates: a ‘brain drain’ tax, an 
international air transport tax, taxation of ocean fishing, taxation of arms 
exports, a ‘bit tax’, and a luxury goods tax. Each of these warrants 
examination. We are not arguing that the global taxes investigated here are 
superior to those not covered. Rather we took two of the most widely 
discussed – the Tobin tax and environmental taxes – as examples of 
possible global taxes. Similarly, it should be stressed that the coverage of 
non-fiscal measures is not exhaustive. We do not, for example, cover 
measures to raise capital funds in developed countries or measures to 
leverage the funds arising from trade. 
Some of the proposals have multiple objectives, but our focus here is 
on their potential as a source of development funding. The creation of 
SDRs was first proposed to ease problems of international liquidity, but 
here we are concerned with their potential role for development purposes. 
The Tobin tax was initially advocated as a means of reducing financial 
volatility (see Haq, Kaul and Grunberg, 1996), and taxes on energy use are 
proposed to slow down global warming, but in both cases we are 
concerned here with the revenue they could generate to finance 
development. 
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Box 2: Innovative Sources of Development Funding Considered Here 
Source  
Global environmental taxes Tax on goods generating environmental 
externalities, with specific reference to a tax 
on use of hydrocarbon fuels according to 
their carbon content.  
  
Currency transactions tax 
(‘Tobin tax’) 
Tax on foreign currency transactions, 
collected on a national or a market basis, 
covering a range of transactions to be 
defined (spot, forward, future, swaps and 
other derivatives).  
  
Creation of new Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) 
Creation of SDRs for development purposes, 
with donor countries making their SDR 
allocation available to fund development. 
  
International Finance Facility (IFF) Long-term, but conditional, funding 
guaranteed to the poorest countries by the 
donor countries. Long-term pledges of a flow 
of annual payments to the IFF would 
leverage additional money from the 
international capital markets.  
  
Increased private donations 
for development 
Charitable donations by private individuals 
and firms. Measures to encourage private 
funding of development: tax incentives, 
Global funds, corporate giving, and the 
Internet. 
  
Global lottery or global premium bond Global lottery operated through national 
state-operated and state-licensed lotteries, 
with proceeds shared between national 
participants and an independent foundation 
established in conjunction with UN. Global 
premium bond, parallel to national bonds with 
lottery prizes. 
  
Increased remittances 
from emigrants 
Logistics (reducing cost of remittances), 
financial institutions (encouraging 
repatriation) and citizenship rather than 
residence basis for taxation.  
 
The first conclusion reached in our report is that the two global taxes 
considered could yield revenue of the magnitude required (tax on carbon 
use) or at least half of the requirement (Tobin tax at a rate of 2 basis 
points). As already stressed, the target $50 billion is a relatively small 
percentage of the gross national income of rich countries. It is some 0.25 
per cent of the total income of the EU and US combined.  
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The second conclusion is that the tax rates required for this purpose are 
an order of magnitude smaller than the tax rates proposed by those 
advocating these taxes on allocational grounds. The Tobin taxes proposed 
to ‘put sand in the wheels of international finance’ have been 10 or 20 basis 
points, or ten times larger. The energy tax considered here has a rate per 
metric ton of a tenth or a twentieth of those typically considered in the 
literature on global warming.  
Third, there are alternatives to global taxation. The International Finance 
Facility proposed by the UK government (HM Treasury and Department 
for International Development, 2003) could, if it attracts sufficient support 
from other major donors, yield flows over the crucial period up to 2015 of 
the magnitude required. (Although it is open to question how far this 
differs at heart from a commitment to expand ODA.) The creation of 
SDRs for development purposes has been envisaged as raising some 
US$25-30 billion. This means that it could contribute a significant part of 
the total, but would need to be combined with other measures, particularly 
if such allocations were made less frequently than annually. One such 
additional source is the global lottery, which could generate significant 
revenues, if agreement can be reached with national lotteries (Ahde, 
Pentikäinen and Seppänen, 2002). A global premium or prize bond could 
provide a flow of loan funding not otherwise available. Supporting roles 
could be played by increased remittances from emigrants, and, on a more 
modest scale, increased private donations. 
Fourth, in each case, we have to investigate how far the funds raised are 
additional. Countries signing up to the global lottery, for example, or for a 
global tax, may cut back on their ODA. There is a risk that innovative 
measures crowd-out ODA. This is a serious risk, but it should be noted 
that among the countries actively canvassing support for new measures are 
those that have also announced that they will reach the 0.7 per cent ODA 
target. 
3.  Global Public Finance 
 The innovative sources are, therefore, worthy of further consideration. 
Each of the proposals raises distinct issues, and these are considered in the 
different chapters of Atkinson (2004). But one of the contributions of the 
report is to identify a number of over-arching issues. Our aim has been to 
bring to bear on the global funding of the MDGs the accumulated 
knowledge in the field of national public finance. Here I focus on three 
main lessons. 
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Tax/Spending Versus Differential Incidence 
First, there is the relation with ODA. As we have seen, the target of an 
additional $50 billion could be achieved by a doubling of ODA, and in 
debating the merits of new sources of development funding, there is 
sometimes confusion as to whether the new sources are intended to be 
supplementary or in place of increased ODA. We need to distinguish 
carefully two different comparisons. The first is between the current 
position, labelled “Starting Point (O)” in Figure 2, and a situation, labelled 
“New Sources (A)” in Figure 2, where there are new sources raising $50 
billion to fund the MDGs. We are then comparing the economic costs of 
the tax with the benefits from the MDG funding (this is the comparison 
labelled “tax/spending incidence” in Figure 2). To argue against the new 
sources, one would have to say that the cost is too great, compared with 
the benefits from achieving the MDGs. The second comparison is between 
new sources raising $50 billion, labelled “New Sources (A)” in Figure 2 and 
increased ODA of the same amount, labelled point B in Figure 2. We are 
then holding constant the contribution to development funding and 
considering different methods of financing. (This is the comparison of A 
with B labelled “differential incidence” in Figure 2.) It would be a 
legitimate argument against the new sources to say that their cost is too 
great, compared with the cost of raising the domestic taxes necessary to 
fund the increased ODA by donors. 
The importance of clarity about the argument is illustrated by the case 
of the global lottery. Opponents criticise this proposal on the grounds that 
the burden falls predominantly on poorer people in rich countries, whereas 
the cost of ODA financed through income taxation is borne by the better 
off. This distributional analysis relates to a differential analysis of 
substituting a global lottery for increased ODA (moving from B to A in 
Figure 2). In contrast, a global lottery as an addition to existing funding 
may have quite different implications. The transfer from rich countries may 
be distributionally progressive in world terms, even when it is the lower 
income groups who buy lottery tickets. We may think differently about a 
lottery that moves us from O to A than about one which moves us from B 
to A. 
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Figure 2: Net Addition to Development Resources or Alternative Source 
Starting 
Point
Increased ODA
New Sources
Equal 
Revenue
Differential 
Incidence
Tax/Spending  
incidence
A
B
O
Who Pays? 
With all the proposals for new sources, one has to ask – who pays? There 
are good reasons to expect that new global taxes will be passed on to final 
users. This applies to energy taxes. People tend to think immediately of the 
impact of a carbon tax on the fuel and transport costs of households, but 
energy costs enter also as inputs in other sectors. The operating costs of 
the financial sector, for example, will be increased, so that part may appear 
as higher prices for apparently unrelated products. In the case of the Tobin 
tax, one has similarly to work through the input-output consequences to 
determine the final incidence. Part of the burden may well fall on 
developing countries: for instance if the tax increases the cost of making 
remittances from emigrants. The question of incidence is not limited to the 
two tax proposals. Other measures have their costs. The increase in ODA 
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that is effectively envisaged under the International Finance Facility (IFF) 
has to be financed, and the future commitments may affect the budgetary 
position of donor countries. It is illusory to suppose that simply adopting 
an alternative funding route avoids all cost. 
Here I should note that our analysis of incidence can be no more firmly 
based than the economic model on which it is based. Unfortunately, we 
have only limited understanding of the economic impact of the different 
proposals. The final incidence of a global tax, such as the carbon tax, 
depends on the responses of firms and households that determine the 
ultimate general equilibrium. We can only guess that the impact of a 
currency transactions tax will be larger in countries more engaged in 
international trade. Views about the macro-economic impact of SDR 
creation depend on how one believes that the world economy operates. We 
know relatively little about the impact of remittances from migrant 
workers. We know little about what influences the destination of private 
giving. 
Double D vidend? i
It is often argued that the proposals considered here have other advantages 
apart from the revenue raised. This is the “double dividend” argument. 
Both energy use and currency transactions taxes have potential to act as 
corrective taxes. At the same time as funding development, we are helping 
to reduce global warming and to discourage currency speculation. There is 
an allocational benefit. However, as already noted, the proposed tax rates 
are much lower than those advocated for these purposes. The taxes are not 
therefore guaranteed to have any major behavioural impact, discouraging 
pollution and speculation. Indeed, there is something of a trade-off. From 
the standpoint of raising revenue, we want to tax an activity that is 
relatively unresponsive, so it is good news if the elasticity of demand is low; 
whereas if we wish to discourage the activity, we hope that the elasticity is 
high. Taking this argument to the limit, we may note that a carbon tax that 
reduced emissions to zero would be an environmental success but a 
revenue failure! 
 There are also political considerations. It is often suggested that the 
double dividend argument strengthens the case for certain global taxes. 
Two justifications are better than one. This argument is related to the 
classic model of “logrolling” where two politicians agree to support each 
other’s pet projects. However, the logrolling model assumes a particular 
distribution of benefits and losses from the projects, the former being 
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concentrated and the latter diffuse. Because the benefits are concentrated, 
it is easy to build coalitions. But in the case of development funding and 
environmental protection, the reverse may be true: the costs may be largely 
borne by a small interest group, and the benefits widely dispersed. To be 
more concrete, opening up two fronts also invites attack from both 
directions, particularly if, as we have seen, the two objectives require taxes 
at very different levels. The double dividend case for the Tobin tax risks 
attracting the hostility of opponents of the exchange stabilising level of 
taxation, who would not necessarily oppose the much lower rate envisaged 
here. 
The double dividend argument should not, in my view, be over-sold. 
The much more modest tax rates envisaged here are more likely to be 
politically acceptable and less likely to have disruptive economic 
consequences than the global taxes proposed to curb speculation or to 
prevent environmental damage. 
4.  Fiscal Architecture 
 If the new sources require government action (as we have noted, not all 
do), then does the success and effectiveness of any particular proposal 
depend on complete adhesion of all donor countries? The natural instinct 
of many people is to assume that there is an inherent free-rider problem 
and that there has to be general, if not universal, agreement. In the present 
climate, with multilateralism under question, this presumption provides 
grounds for pessimism about the chances of making progress. On the 
other hand, suppose that we start from the position that universal 
agreement may be impossible and examine the implications of going ahead 
with a subset of countries? The US has so far prevented the creation by the 
IMF of Special Drawing Rights, and in this case no action seems possible. 
But it does not follow that other measures are also blocked. With the other 
six proposals, it would be possible, at least theoretically, for progress to be 
made even without the agreement of all major countries. Here we can learn 
from the internal experience of the European Union (EU). The EU has in 
the past faced situations where one member state chose to ‘opt out’ of 
collective decisions. In these circumstances, flexibility in the resulting 
institutions has allowed the majority to respect the opting-out decision but 
still make progress towards the majority objectives. There is “flexible 
geometry”. Partial adhesion has costs, but the issue becomes one of 
balance, rather than an absolute block on action.  
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We have to ask therefore in the case of each proposal whether we can 
in fact have a “flexible geometry”, where it is viable to go ahead with a 
subset of countries? The likely answer to this question varies from one 
proposal to another. The costs of incomplete coverage depend on the 
nature of the source of funding. Failure of countries to participate in the 
International Finance Facility means that the scale of the operation is 
reduced, but the proposal is not undermined. The same applies to the 
Global Lottery, or the Global Premium Bond; indeed insofar as these 
schemes offer a new product, those not participating may lose out. With 
global taxation, the free-riding problems become potentially more 
significant. Significant opting out from a global carbon tax may erode the 
tax base, as producers relocate to non-participating countries, and expose 
participating countries to intense lobbying from domestic interests. With a 
currency transactions tax, ease of relocation of financial activity depends on 
how extensive is the taxing jurisdiction. The larger the jurisdiction, the less 
elastic the response, and hence the greater the revenue potential. It 
certainly seems realistic to explore how far the euro area on its own could 
introduce a Tobin tax at a modest rate. Current fears about the strength of 
the euro relative to the dollar suggest that now is a good time to ask this 
question. 
Flexibility may also be important in a different sense when it comes to 
the administration of global taxation. A typical flow chart for national 
taxation is shown in Figure 3. National governments determine the rates of 
taxation and the tax base. Individual taxpayers pay the taxes to the 
government, which both enforces payment and is in turn accountable to 
the electorate. Many taxes involve intermediary agents. The individual 
taxpayer is shown in Figure 3, for example, as paying the aircraft departure 
tax to the airline, which then accounts for the revenue to the government.  
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Figure 3: Fiscal Architecture – National Taxation 
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One evidently cannot apply exactly the same process to global taxation 
(Figure 4). We have both global institutions and national governments, and 
it is the latter which have to agree to the taxes being levied and which are 
accountable to their electorates. It could indeed be that the global tax is 
treated as simply a glorified domestic tax, with the revenue being 
forwarded by national governments to a global spending body (the heavy 
lines in Figure 4). But there are more possibilities, as shown by the dashed 
and dotted lines. If there were an international air transport tax determined 
at the global level, then the airline could transfer the money, not to the 
national government, but to a global tax authority, in which case the new 
source of finance would bring a new actor into play. The dashed lines in 
Figure 4 show this. Whether or not such a world tax authority (Tanzi, 
1999) is envisaged is one of the questions that have to be considered.  
 
Figure 4: Fiscal Architecture in Global Setting 
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Moving in the opposite direction from the introduction of a world tax 
authority is the case shown by dotted lines in Figure 4, where national 
governments retain not only control over the administration of the tax 
process but also discretion over the tax rates. In this case, participating 
governments would agree on their national tax liability but retain freedom 
to decide how the revenue is to be raised. This would in effect be applying 
the principle of subsidiarity adopted by the European Union. To give a 
concrete illustration, suppose that the participating governments agree that 
each country should pay a tax related to national carbon emissions. This 
determines the amount that each participating country has to pay, but the 
national government would remain free to raise the revenue in whatever 
manner it thought fit. The national government might consider, for 
example, that a tax on air journeys was unfair on those living in remote 
rural areas, and choose for domestic reasons a different tax base. We would 
then have a two-tier structure, with the national tax obligation requirement 
being agreed multilaterally, but the tax implementation being chosen 
locally. Countries with more emissions would pay more total tax, but this 
would not necessarily mean higher fuel taxes. Income tax or a broad-based 
VAT could be raised instead. One reason why, under the subsidiarity 
architecture, a national government may choose a different tax base is that 
it faces political opposition to a particular form of taxation. The fuel tax 
protests of 2000 in Europe provide a good illustration. 
5. A Global Income Tax Initiative 
 This leads me to a proposal that goes beyond those considered in our 
report: a global income tax initiative. In a number of OECD countries 
there has been a large increase in the share of income going to the very top 
– the top 0.1 per cent or smaller groups. Piketty and Saez (2003) have 
demonstrated this for the US. In the UK, the share of the top 1 per cent in 
before-tax income rose from 5.7 per cent in 1978 to 8.7 per cent in 1989, 
and by a further 3 percentage points in the next 10 years (Atkinson, 
forthcoming). Nolan (forthcoming) shows that the share of the top 1 per 
cent rose substantially in Ireland in the 1990s. 
Alongside the rise in the top shares has been a fall in the top rates of 
income tax in the US, the UK, and other countries. These falls have in part 
been the result of tax competition, with countries seeking to attract the 
wealthy and to make their economies attractive to multinational 
enterprises. This leads me to a proposal that is directed both at reducing 
tax competition and to providing new funds for development. The 
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bargaining power of individual countries could be increased if they band 
together and form a multilateral agreement. This agreement could institute, 
among the countries adhering, an international tax regime that overrides 
the national taxes. The tax authorities would auction Global Tax Permits. 
The successful bidders could become global income taxpayers, with a zero 
marginal rate. The revenue would be divided between the host country, the 
other participating countries, and the funding of the Millennium 
Development Goals. The authorities would reserve the right to reject a bid 
without giving grounds, and the bids would be made public. This 
information would be of considerable value to the tax authorities.  
One can see the attractions to the tax authorities, but why would 
anyone bid? There are two reasons. The first is that many of the very rich 
welcome certainty about their tax affairs, and seek to achieve this by 
reaching agreements with fiscal authorities. When Benjamin Franklin said, 
“… nothing in this world can be said to be certain, except death and 
taxes”, he was only half right. Taxes today are not certain, especially if 
one’s financial affairs are complicated. Then there is vanity. The bids would 
be public and one can imagine that some people would pay to belong to 
this exclusive club – say, the Upper 10,000. Of course the US Government 
may not wish to join, but this is another case where flexible geometry may 
work.  
6. An EU Target: the Missing Chapter of the Lisbon Agenda 
 As I said earlier, I believe that we need to pursue both innovative sources 
and the possibility of increased ODA. I return now to ODA. The purpose 
of this final section is to make the case for a European Union aid target 
more ambitious than the 0.39 per cent committed by the European Union 
in its (very welcome) statement before the Monterrey Conference on 
Financing for Development in March 2002.  
In my view, this is the missing chapter of the Lisbon Agenda. At the 
Lisbon Council of March 2000, Heads of State and Government set out 
the ambition of making the European Union perform as a highly dynamic 
and competitive economy. Plans were announced to liberalise markets and 
to make the labour market more flexible. There has been much discussion 
of these goals, and of the limited progress made to date, but for me one of 
the missing elements in the debate has been the impact on developing 
countries. The Lisbon Agenda may have both positive and negative effects 
on developing countries. On the plus side, faster growth in Europe will 
stimulate demand for their exports. To the extent that productivity rises in 
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the high technology sectors, this may turn the terms of trade in favour of 
developing countries. If, however, the aim of greater flexibility is to reduce 
wage costs, and make Europe more competitive, in low technology sectors, 
then this policy reduces the demand for the products of the newly 
industrialising countries. The exemption of the first tranche of earnings 
from social security taxes, for example, may generate increased 
employment for low-skilled workers in Europe, but it does so by reducing 
the relative price of the import-competing sector. It means that textile 
production remains profitable in the face of competition from lower-wage 
countries. The policy of making ‘Europe more competitive’ has potentially 
negative implications for the rest of the world that have tended to be 
overlooked. 
A policy of domestic labour market reform has, of course, distributional 
implications within, as well as outside, Europe. This is why the Lisbon 
Agenda calls for greater social inclusion. The adoption in 2001 of the 
common set of social indicators means that any adverse effects of labour 
market flexibility on the extent and persistence of poverty will be regularly 
monitored. The Member States are committed to implementing National 
Action Plans on Social Inclusion. This welcome adoption by the EU of a 
social agenda to protect its own citizens should, in my view, be 
accompanied by a more ambitious statement of its concerns for those less 
fortunate who live outside its boundaries. This is reinforced by the recent 
accession of ten new Member States, which will involve a substantive 
degree of redistribution within the enlarged European Union. It is 
important to underline that redistribution is not confined within the 
boundaries of the Union, and that external development assistance to the 
poor worldwide is an essential part of the acquis communautaire. 
Since the first Treaty of Rome, Europe has seen a role for common 
action in the field of development assistance, notably via the association of 
developing countries, and the successive Yaoundé (1963 and 1969) and 
Lomé (1975) Conventions. Since the Maastricht Treaty, development co-
operation has had a specific legal basis (Articles 177-181 of the Treaty on 
European Union). Together, the EU and its Member States provide around 
half of all official international development aid. But the scale of assistance 
could be considerably increased. The EU collective average promised at the 
Monterrey Conference would only reach 0.39 per cent by 2006 (European 
Council, 2002). The more ambitious objective that I have in mind is that 
the EU as a whole should reach the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNP for 
official assistance. The gross national income of the enlarged EU is some 
€10,000 billion (using the American definition of a billion as a thousand 
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million). Reaching the 0.7 per cent target would produce some $70 billion. 
In Atkinson (2002) I was still more ambitious, and argued for a 1 per cent 
target, but even with 0.7 per cent the addition, compared with the 
Monterrey promise, would go a long way towards filling the gap shown in 
Figure 1.  
I should emphasise that I am not suggesting that all EU aid should be 
channelled through EU machinery. I am not taking a position on the 
relative effectiveness of national and EU aid programmes. Nor am I 
proposing that each Member State should contribute 0.7 per cent of its 
national income. Given the differences in income per head across Member 
States, particularly following the recent Accession, there is a case for a 
progressive contribution formula. If we take as a risk of poverty yardstick a 
figure of 60 per cent of the median income for the EU as a whole (adjusted 
for family size and for differences in purchasing power), then a progressive 
aid contribution can be calculated as a percentage of all incomes in excess 
of this amount, referred to as the EU tax threshold. The resulting total 
excess income would then be that country’s “tax base”. The size of the tax 
base relative to total income in a country would then depend on its income 
per head relative to the EU mean, and on its distribution of income. The 
maximum amount that a country can deduct from its total income to arrive 
at its tax base would be equal to the European tax threshold times the total 
population. This only applies if no one in that country has an income 
below the EU tax threshold: to the extent that people do fall below the EU 
threshold, then less can be deducted to arrive at the tax base, and the 
country contributes more. 
7. The Way Forward 
 The direction taken at this juncture will depend largely on political events 
and political decisions. But sober economic analysis has an important role 
to play. 
In this lecture, I have argued that there are ways in which we can fund 
the MDGs. As a proportion of the gross national income of rich countries, 
the sum involved is not large. It could be raised by an increase in ODA to 
some 0.4 per cent of GNI, or well short of the 0.7 per cent target to which 
a number of countries aspire, including Ireland, and indeed not very 
different from that achieved in the early 1990s. The IFF proposed by the 
UK government could facilitate this increase in ODA. I have argued that it 
would be timely for the EU to adopt an explicit target for ODA to reach 
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0.7 per cent for the EU as a whole, with a progressive formula for the 
contribution by individual Member States. 
But I have also suggested that we need to pursue both a policy of 
increasing ODA and of seeking new sources, such as global taxation. Both 
approaches – increased ODA and new sources – will take time, and time is 
of the essence. I have argued that a package of new sources could be 
assembled for this purpose. This could include a global energy tax and/or a 
Tobin tax on currency transactions. These proposals have been around for 
a long time – we are celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of Tobin (1974) – 
but it is important to stress that the taxes considered here are an order of 
magnitude smaller than those advocated to address global warming or to 
deter currency speculation. This means that one cannot claim much in the 
way of a “double dividend”, but the more modest tax rates envisaged here 
are more likely to be politically acceptable and less likely to have disruptive 
economic consequences. We need also to entertain flexibility. The tax may 
be introduced by a subset of countries. For example, the euro zone can 
consider introducing a currency transactions tax, even if the homeland of 
its inventor does not follow suit. We can separate the taxation of countries 
from the taxation of citizens: a tax on a country’s CO2 emissions does not 
have to be raised by domestic fuel taxes. We have therefore tried to think 
in a novel way about long-standing proposals. Equally, we have analysed 
new proposals, such as the International Finance Facility, and the global 
lottery. We have put forward new ideas, such as the global prize bond, and 
(not in our report) the global income tax initiative. 
Politically, there are grounds both for pessimism and for optimism. 
Two powerful and divergent forces grip the world at present. On the one 
hand the effectiveness of international organisations has been called into 
question. The role and functioning of the United Nations is debated. Some 
nations exhibit frustration with multilateral co-operation. In the field of 
development finance, there is talk of “donor fatigue”. Proposals for global 
taxation meet immediate opposition from powerful elements in the US 
Congress. On the other hand, the recognition is being cemented that a 
global economy requires global institutions. International organisations are 
viewed by many as the key to the free movement of goods, services and 
capital. We have seen the adoption of ambitious development targets in the 
form of the Millennium Development Goals. Donor countries have 
pledged increases in Official Development Assistance. Individuals continue 
to support development charities. US billionaires are personally funding 
development and world health activities. 
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Where do I stand? After completing our WIDER report, I was asked to 
join a Technical Group established by President Chirac, which prepared a 
report under the chairmanship of Jean-Pierre Landau (2004), French 
Director of EBRD. The reports were presented at the first global 
intergovernmental conference to discuss innovative means of financing 
development on 20 September 2004. This meeting of world leaders was 
convened by President Lula da Silva of Brazil, co-sponsored by President 
Chirac and President Lagos of Chile, and Prime Minister Zapatero of 
Spain. Some 50 Heads of State and Government attended the meeting. The 
US representative argued that global taxes are undemocratic and 
impossible, but 113 countries signed a declaration that further 
consideration be given to the proposals. I end therefore on a note of 
cautious optimism. 
19 
References 
AHDE, M., A. PENTIKÄINEN, and J-M. SEPPÄNEN, 2002. Global 
Lottery, Crisis Management Initiative, Helsinki. 
ATKINSON, A. B., 2002. “1 per cent of €10,000 billion” in P. Townsend 
and D. Gordon (eds.), World Poverty, Bristol: The Policy Press.  
ATKINSON, A. B. (ed.), 2004. New Sources of Development Finance, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
ATKINSON, A. B., 2004. New Sources of Development Finance: Funding the 
Millennium Development Goals, WIDER Policy Brief No 10. 
ATKINSON, A. B. (forthcoming), “Top Incomes in the United Kingdom 
over the Twentieth Century”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. 
DEVARAJAN, S., M. J. MILLER, and E. V. SWANSON, 2002. “Goals 
for development”, Policy Research Working Paper 2819, New York: 
World Bank Human Development Network. 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 2002. “Conclusions on The International 
Conference on Financing for Development”, EU website, 15 March 
2002. 
HAQ, M. UL, I. KAUL, and I. GRUNBERG (eds.), 1996. The Tobin Tax, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
HM TREASURY AND DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT, 2003. International Finance Facility, London: HM 
Treasury. 
LANDAU, J-P. (ed.), 2004. Les nouvelles contributions financières internationales, 
La documentation Française, Paris. 
NOLAN, B. (forthcoming), “Long-Term Trends in Top Income Shares in 
Ireland” in A. B. Atkinson and T. Piketty (eds.), Top Incomes over the 
Twentieth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
PIKETTY, T., and E. SAEZ, 2003. “Income Inequality in the United States”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118,  pp. 1-39.  
REISEN, H., 2004. “Innovative Approaches to Funding the Millennium 
Development Goals”, OECD Development Centre Policy Brief 24, 
Paris: OECD. 
TANZI, V., 1999. “Is There a Need for a World Tax Organisation?” in A. 
Razin and E. Sadka (eds.), The Economics of Globalization, New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
 
 
20 
UNITED NATIONS, 2001. Report of the High-Level Panel on Financing for 
Development (chair Ernesto Zedillo), New York: United Nations. 
WORLD BANK, 2004. Global Monitoring Report 2004, Washington, DC: 
World Bank.  
 
21 
